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Abstract 
The article is devoted to a phenomenon called vertical separation in the area of 
network industries. Vertical separation is understood as de-merging of infrastructure 
and delegating control over it to independent manager banned from operating 
on downstream markets which are subject to liberalisation. Arguments for and 
against these tendencies have been examined using the example of the European 
railway transport. The complete analysis presents vertical separation as a promising 
solution for the railway industry. One of the conditions for the success of this 
reform is forming of a close cooperative relationship, based on loyalty and trust, 
between the infrastructure manager and its clients – rail operators. Building such 
a relationship should be supported by the implemented regulatory policy.
Classifications and key words: network industries, public utilities, railway transport, 
economic regulation, liberalisation, vertical separation.
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I. Introduction
Contemporary economics considers the problem of vertical integration of 
economic activity to be an issue of great interest. Somewhat less attention 
has been so far paid to the “mirror reflection” of this problem – vertical 
disintegration. The latter issue is usually analyzed in the context of vertical 
specialization of production. However, vertical disintegration is also 
a particularly interesting area of the experiments of public authorities which 
undertake liberalization reforms in public utilities. Those that reform public 
utilities, eager to open them up to competition, can decide to de-merge 
infrastructure from a previously monopolistic incumbent and entrust it to an 
infrastructure manager banned from operating on downstream markets which 
are subject to liberalisation1. Literature rarely calls this approach “vertical 
disintegration” using instead terms such as “vertical separation” (as used in 
this article), “unbundling”, “vertical divestiture” or “break-up”.  
The term “experiment” has been used here on purpose. The view is often 
stressed in literature that in recent decades economic regulation has become 
less discretionary and more based on an economic analysis (at least in OECD 
countries). However, the first wave of vertical separation in network industries, 
taking place in the last decade of the 20th century 2 , was based on activities of 
a discretionary and controversial character that prioritized positive results of 
liberalization above all else. At the same time, they lacked any in-depth analysis 
of the potential negative long-term effects of the reforms that took place in 
industries, which had been historically formed and, until then operating in 
a vertically-integrated manner.
This refers to EU countries as well. The basis of the reform of network 
industries in the EU can be summarized with the motto: “competition where 
possible, regulation where not”. When the introduction of competition is at 
stake, infrastructure de-merging and entrusting its management to a specially 
established company (vertical structural separation) seems to be a much bet-
ter solution than its “liberalization alternative”. The latter solution is usually 
1 I.e. final consumer service markets.
2 In some countries, it began several years earlier, in others, it ended a little later (e.g. 
in Poland). In Poland, vertical separation in infrastructure sectors has been implemented 
in the power industry – where the PSE Operator, a Transmission System Operator (TSO), 
was established within the structure of the PSE energy company as a functionally unbundled 
company – and in railway transport – where the infrastructure manager PKP Polskie Linie 
Kolejowe SA (lit. Polish Rail Lines) was structurally separated. The telecoms regulator has 
for the time being withdrawn from the already advanced plans of a functional separation of 
Telekomunikacja Polska SA (TP SA). 
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referred to in literature as mandatory or open access3. It consists of the provi-
sion to new market entrants of non-discriminatory access to infrastructure 
controlled by an (vertically-integrated) incumbent. 
An incumbent that controls infrastructure can be tempted to refuse or limit 
granting access to new entrants (its rivals in downstream markets). However, 
the means of blocking access to service markets and strategic entry deterrence 
available to an incumbent are very limited if infrastructure management is 
entrusted to a separate entity, which has no incentive to discriminate since it 
does not compete in downstream markets. Separating infrastructure from an 
incumbent is thus meant to eliminate the risk of vertical market foreclosure by 
a former monopolist4. Many examples of such activities are still taking place. 
Thus, while solutions based on mandatory access are aimed at counteracting 
foreclosure and consist of enforcing of the granting of non-discriminatory 
access by the regulator, the object of vertical separation is to eliminate it 
altogether. It is this very feature that determines the attractiveness of vertical 
separation. However, its critics argue that vertical separation in infrastructure 
industries entails a severe interference in the traditional vertical structure 
of these industries (mandatory access does not have a structural character) 
resulting, in particular, in an increase in the costs of vertical coordination of 
the production process. Some commentators go as far as to accuse public 
authorities of doctrinalism and ignoring the shortcomings of this solution.  
Railway transport constitutes an area of particular interest from the 
point of view of vertical separation of infrastructure industries. The eminent 
American economic historian A. D. Chandler claimed that railway companies 
– besides telegraph ones – were “the first modern business enterprises to 
appear in the United States”5. The railway sector was the first industry to see 
the appearance of a hierarchical managerial organization (low, medium and 
top level management). Railway transport, the emergence and development 
3 Presenting the „liberalization alternative” in this manner – vertical disintegration of an 
incumbent v. no disintegration coupled with mandatory network access – is a simplification 
common in industrial economics, especially this based on a formal analysis. In the practice 
of individual industries, several degrees of vertical disintegration can be distinguished. The 
growing literature on this subject usually speaks of its four areas – separation of accounts that 
must accompany mandatory access, functional (called also operational) separation as well as 
structural separation right up to the separation of ownership. 
4 The expression “vertical market foreclosure” is used in industrial economics to refer to 
a situation where a company operating in a competitive downstream market simultaneously 
operates in a closely connected monopolistic upstream market and denies (or hinders) access 
to an asset (e.g. infrastructure) supplied by this market which is a key production input in the 
downstream market. In this way the company expands its market power from the upstream 
market to the competitive downstream market.
5 A. D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 
Cambridge 1977, p. 79. 
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of which largely conditioned the industrial revolution of the 19th century, 
was not accidentally the first industry to be subjected to modern sector-
specific regulation (in the US – in 1887). It constituted an innovation not 
only in technological but also in organizational terms. Its structure was well 
thought out and refined over the decades. The separation of infrastructure 
from operational business may thus seem to be particularly controversial and 
precipitate action in the case of this industry. 
Indeed, vertical separation has been repeatedly criticized by railway circles6. 
Still, the opinions remain divided both among industry representatives and 
researchers. The dominant view among scholars is that railway transport is 
a particularly difficult and unpromising area for vertical disintegration as 
compared to other network industries. This view is supported by such eminent 
researchers as J. A. Gómez-Ibáñez7 and R. Pittman8. Ch. Nash and C. Riviera-
Trujillo9 stress that the “[s]eparation of infrastructure from operations has 
been argued to be an essential prerequisite for non discriminatory access, yet 
it raises important issues of transaction costs”, which remains an important 
research question.
Similarly, according to the authors of econometric analysis, the conclusions 
that can be drawn for economic policy implications of vertical separation 
are ambiguous. At the end of their interesting econometric research, 
Ch. Growitsch and H. Wetzel10 remark that: „[i]ndeed, economies of scope 
exist for a majority of integrated European railway companies. Future sector 
restructuring should be aware of that issue and avoid increasing transaction 
costs unnecessarily. On the other hand, not disentangling the railway sector 
further retains discriminatory incentives and complicates regulation. Policy 
makers should carefully outweigh positive and negative aspects of vertical 
integration in railways”. 
 6 See e.g.  C. Pfund, “The separation of railway infrastructure and operations constitutes 
a fundamental mistake” (2003) 3 Public Transport International.
 7 J. A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Regulating Infrastructure. Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion, 
Cambridge 2003, p. 338. 
 8 R. Pittman, Structural Separation and Access Pricing in the Railways Sector: Sauce for the 
Goose Only? (October 15, 2004),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=605621
 9 Nash Ch., Rivera-Trujillo C., Rail regulatory reform in Europe – principles and practice, 
Paper presented at the Conference on Competition in the Rail Industry, Madrid, September 
2004.
10 Growitsch C., Wetzel H., Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency 
Analysis “University of Lüneburg Working Paper Series in Economics”, No. 29, July 2006. 
p. 17–18.
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II.  Benefits for competition resulting from vertical separation 
in railway transport in the European environment 
Ch. Nash and C. Riveira-Trujillo refer to the American example where 
vertically integrated railway undertakings operate on each other’s infrastructure. 
In their opinion, this can indicate that non-discriminatory access can be 
achieved without complete separation. Although this view is not stated directly, 
it can be assumed that what they mean is to achieve this goal without excessive 
regulation, at a satisfactory cost and in reasonable time11. Similar views were 
formulated by other scholars on the basis of American experiences12.
The example of the US is undoubtedly of particular interest. It should 
be pointed out however that American railway companies make their 
infrastructure available to each other on a reciprocal basis. It is this very 
reciprocity that differentiates the American from the European railway 
sector – while the former is characterised by symmetry, the latter is plagued 
by asymmetry when it comes to the problem of who controls infrastructure. 
In Europe, railway tracks are run either by vertically-integrated incumbents 
or, as a result of vertical separation, by independent infrastructure managers. 
Literature on industrial organization often stresses that asymmetry resulting 
from a competitive edge proves not only the necessary condition but also an 
impulse for a company to implement strategic behavior elements13. In the 
example presented here, the competitive advantage enjoyed by an incumbent 
stems from exclusive control over the key input (i.e. infrastructure) for the 
provision of downstream services. 
Unlike in Europe, the situation of American operators is also symmetric in 
that they present similar efficiency levels. By contrast, at least in the period 
following liberalization (in practice for much longer), incumbents could be 
expected to be less efficient than new entrants. Lower efficiency of incumbents 
can derive from a number of factors such as: overstaffing; unfavourably 
structured personnel; frequently de-capitalized and obsolete production assets; 
ineffective management structures; inexperience of the management as far as 
free market conditions are concerned; poor circulation of information within 
an entity of an unusually large size; disproportionate strength of labour unions; 
11 Assuming that costs and time flow are irrelevant, the problem of information asymmetry 
between a regulator and an infrastructure-controlling incumbent seems insignificant.
12 See e.g. J. A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Regulating Infrastructure…, p. 339; R. Pittman, Structural 
Separation.., op. cit.
13 See e.g. D. W. Carlton, J. M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, Boston 2005, p. 352. 
Strategic behaviour (more strictly: non-cooperative strategic behaviour) encompasses the actions 
of a firm trying to maximize its profits by improving its position relative to its rivals.
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a de-motivating remuneration scheme; and a negligent approach towards the 
firm’s property which can lead to theft or destruction. 
Moreover, at the moment of liberalization, vertically integrated incumbents 
were usually burdened with the public service task of providing passenger 
transport. In Europe, public services were traditionally financed by cross-
subsidization. In the case of the railway sector, it took the form of subsidizing 
passenger transport by freight services. Market liberalization should entail 
the abandonment of these practices but this is not common. Instead, new 
entrants are most active in the most lucrative segments of the market and 
thus, by “skimming the cream”, achieve higher operational efficiency than 
incumbents. It is clear, that the latter will note the asymmetry of efficiency 
and profitability to their disadvantage. It is thus likely that an incumbent will 
be eager to reduce that asymmetry by taking advantage of its control over 
railway tracks. It can also be assumed that the fiercer the competitive pressure 
exerted on a vertically-integrated incumbent, the more inclined it will be to 
strategic behaviours, which will in turn translate into denials of fair access to 
infrastructure.
As early as 1917, T. Veblen noted that: „[a]ll business sagacity reduces itself 
in the last analysis to a judicious use of sabotage”14. Sabotage, nowadays often 
referred to as strategic behaviour, can in this example take such forms as:
1) explicit refusal to grant infrastructure access; 
2) demanding excessive price for access;
3) discrimination in network capacity allocation;
4) necessity to meet additional requirements;
5) denial of access to additional services or facilities;
6) delaying access to infrastructure and limiting access to information; 
7) offering a lower standard of access than agreed and mounting “artificial 
obstacles”.
The range of tools for discrimination at the disposal of a vertically-integrated 
incumbent is thus very wide. “Opportunity makes a thief” writes A. Sulejewicz 
referring to a situation where the drive to maximize profits makes a company 
take advantage of all available business opportunities15. Sticking with the 
criminal rhetoric, a vertically-integrated incumbent has not only the motives 
but also all the necessary means to commit a crime. Clearly, this metaphor 
should not be taken literally. An incumbent can indeed use illegal tools for 
discrimination (e. g. excessive access prices) but it can also take advantage 
of loopholes or inconsistencies in its institutional arrangements (e.g. those 
14 T. Veblen, An Inqiury Into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation, The 
Macmillan Company, 1917 p. 152.
15 A. Sulejewicz, Partnerstwo strategiczne: modelowanie współpracy przedsiębiorstw, Warszawa 
1997, p. 117.
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relating to network capacity allocation) which, theoretically at least, do not 
constitute a breach of existing provisions.
The asymmetry between vertically-integrated incumbents and other 
market players in relation to infrastructure control pushes incumbents to use 
discriminative measures in fulfilling their access obligations. Another form of 
asymmetry between an incumbent, its rivals (i.e. its clients in the upstream 
market) and a sector-specific regulator relates to information, which constitutes 
an additional incentive to discriminate for an incumbent. Information 
asymmetry is related to various aspects of granting infrastructure access and 
in particular, to access pricing and capacity allocation. Economic theory shows 
that information asymmetry can entail the danger of moral hazard, which is the 
case in the analyzed scenario. Such asymmetry may nevertheless be attenuated 
by a regulator, provided that appropriate resources (e.g. highly qualified 
personnel) are used for that purpose. This might prove to be a great problem 
in practice since regulatory authority is executed by governmental bodies that 
often suffer from the scarcity of resources (personnel and financial). Since 
railway transport is not a socially sensitive industry, such as telecoms or the 
energy sector, it can be difficult to persuade decision-makers to assign the 
necessary means to a railway regulator.
Despite the major importance of information asymmetry for an incumbent’s 
motivation, it no longer plays a significant role in the case of several of the 
aforementioned categories of discrimination. One of those categories is the 
explicit refusal to grant infrastructure access, based on an incumbent’s belief 
that such an action will prove profitable, or from loopholes and inconsistencies 
in regulatory provisions. The latter can occur, for instance, when law-makers 
fail to introduce a legal obligation to grant access to a specific infrastructure 
element (e.g. sidings in Poland). Referring once again to the famous opinion 
of T. Veblen, it can be assumed that refusal to grant access can be embraced 
by an incumbent as a judicious action providing that the relevant sectorial 
regulator remains passive in this respect or is unable to implement the 
necessary regulatory decisions or impose sanctions. 
The passiveness of a regulator may result from a scarcity of the tools and 
resources at his disposal or even from an unwillingness to act. This can in 
turn be associated with internal reasons – with a close relationship between 
a regulatory office and an incumbent in particular. Such links are inevitable 
in industries which used to be monopolised – otherwise regulatory offices 
could not employ any personnel with notable industry experience. Lack 
of commitment on the side of a regulator can also be caused by external 
reasons such as political support enjoyed by an incumbent. Major state-owned 
companies (e.g. integrated railroad enterprises) enjoy a very strong position 
because of their large workforce, usually organized in strong labor unions, 
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their “social mission” and often a management structure closely related to 
the political sphere. Moreover, state authorities are usually responsible for 
the direct supervision of incumbents seeing as their treasuries generally 
remain as their primary shareholder. Regulated industries can thus struggle 
with a conflict between their regulatory and proprietary functions. In such 
cases, a regulator might be under pressure to turn a blind eye to some of the 
activities of an incumbent. 
Railroad transport is no exception. In fact, a wider problem is addressed here 
of the will to act not only on the side of a sector-specific regulator but also of 
any given government that can hamper any reforms started by its predecessors. 
Additionally, already privileged state-owned incumbents frequently enjoy 
an informal (no legal basis) status of a “national operator”. To illustrate, in 
Poland, official governmental documents use this term when referring to all 
train-operating companies of the incumbent “Polish State Railways” even 
though it was not introduced by existing legal provisions16. This is all the 
more important because EU reforms of railway transport involve the opening 
up of national markets to foreign competition. As can be expected in such 
a situation, arguments are voiced in some EU countries for the strengthening 
of the competitive potential of “national operators”, granting them protection 
periods before the introduction of foreign competitors or even in favor of the 
creation of “European champions”. In this climate, it seems easier to gain 
political consent for the discrimination of some of the participants of national 
railway markets especially when their stockholders are foreign. 
Thus the issue of a strategic use of political and legislative processes for 
one’s own purpose becomes evident. This issue has long since been raised in 
economic literature but not necessarily in relation to state-owned firms only. 
Among authors concerned with this problem are J. A. Ordover and G. Saloner, 
the latter calling such actions “perhaps one of the most efficient methods for 
disadvantaging existing and prospective competitors that is available to an 
incumbent firm”17. However, this problem seems to be particularly severe 
in the case of a state-owned incumbent operating in a regulated industry. It 
highlights the issue of a regulator’s autonomy from the sector it regulates, 
from other bodies of state authority and from other participants of the political 
process. Although autonomy does not guarantee a regulator’s commitment, 
it remains a necessary condition for a regulator to demonstrate his willingness 
to act. 
16 See Strategy for railroad transport till 2013 adopted by the Ministry of Transport in April 
2007, p. 23, 31 and others.
17 J. A. Ordover, G. Saloner, “Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust” [in:] Schmalensee 
R., Willig R.D. (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1, Amsterdam 1989, p. 573.
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A number of criteria must be met for a regulator to be able to challenge 
a vertically-integrated incumbent that remains determined to prevent new 
entrants from accessing its infrastructure. Regulators must be equipped with 
sufficient resources, regulatory tools and the will to act. According to the 
authors of a report on structural reforms in the rail industry in the OECD 
countries [2005]: „[a] well-resourced regulator, through persistence and 
vigilance, could hope to limit the anti-competitive activity of the incumbent, 
but the outcome is unlikely to be as much competition as would arise in the 
absence of the incentive to restrict competition. Potential entrants, fearing the 
effects of discrimination, despite the best efforts of the regulator, may hesitate 
to invest in new capacity”. This is often the case, since the risk of incurring the 
costs of obtaining infrastructure access can be excessive in the perception of 
potential market entrants. This problem concerns primarily transaction costs 
associated with the formulation and enforcement of contracts (e.g. negotiations 
with the incumbent, legal costs, costs associated with running and governing 
the contract or possible court costs). It also relates to the costs of blocking 
financial resources in the means of production as well as alternative costs of 
investment in other industries or investment in financial markets. Even the 
most committed regulator cannot eliminate the risk of bearing those costs by 
new entrants – all a regulator can hope to do is to limit them.
It should be stressed however, that it is not only vertical foreclosure that 
contributes to the weakening of competition in downstream markets but 
also the beliefs of individual investors as to the risk of it actually occurring. 
Investments in rolling stock are highly capital-intensive and attributed to 
highly specialized assets due to, among other things, limited interoperability 
of railway networks in Europe. A high level of asset specificity tends to 
entail higher risk aversion among investors. The success of the liberalization 
process of railway transport might very well depend on enticing investors, 
seeing as its essence is to enhance competition. Vertical separation can in 
this sense constitute a clear sign that the authorities are truly committed to 
liberalization. Entrusting infrastructure to an independent manager eliminates 
the risk of vertical foreclosure and creates the necessary conditions for optimal 
exploitation of traffic capacity. The “incumbent v. rival” relationship is thus 
replaced by the “infrastructure manager v. client” link. This facilitates co-
operation which is particularly important in industries where coordination 
plays a major role. This issue will be addressed further on. 
However, vertical separation is not a remedy for opportunistic behavior of 
an infrastructure manager especially in relation to access pricing. Information 
asymmetry in this field still remains (even if it is reduced by more transparent 
cost allocation) and there is still only one provider in the upstream market, 
a fact that can induce it to use its market power. The infrastructure manager 
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must therefore remain subject to regulatory supervision. However, freed 
from the duty to focus on incumbents, the regulator can redirect its efforts 
towards the supervision of infrastructure access pricing and on raising the cost 
efficiency of the infrastructure manager. The latter issue remains of utmost 
importance to the market considering the relatively high share of monopolistic 
infrastructure costs in the overall costs of railway transport.
III.  Other merits of vertical separation in rail transport 
in the European environment
Benefits for competition that result from vertical separation in rail transport 
are paralleled by profits of another type. Separation is therefore expected 
to help achieve full economies of scale from infrastructure management. 
An independent manager that does not have anti-competitive motivations 
resulting from vertical integration can maximize its service provision potential. 
Literature frequently notes that an infrastructure manager and an incumbent 
operating on downstream markets can both benefit from separation-related 
specialization18. The fact that an infrastructure manager can focus on the 
task of granting access, in addition to its motivation to create a partnership 
in its relationship with its carrier-clients, makes it possible to better adapt the 
upstream offer to the needs of those acting downstream, a fact that can in turn 
lead to mutual benefits. In view of the European Rail Infrastructure Managers 
(EIM) concentration on infrastructure activities leads to economies19.
Nevertheless, extra specialization benefits can also consist of the fact that 
that the structural reform also allows for a horizontal division of the incumbent 
into separate companies operating in various segments of rail transport. This 
provides for a de-merger of not only the companies responsible for public 
service provision (passenger transportation) but also of a freight service 
operator. The latter would then be able to follow what it believes to be the 
optimal path of development (evolving towards e.g. Rail Logistics Operator) 
and, while adapting its offer to the expectations of its clients, enhance its 
competitiveness. A de-merger also makes it possible to evolve further through 
mergers and acquisitions within the transportation and logistics sector. The 
commonness of the division of incumbents into carriers in Europe makes it 
possible to suggest that specialization-related benefits dominate horizontal 
18 See e.g. Structural reform in the rail industry, DAF/COMP(2005)46, (OECD 2005).
19 J. Evans, The case for separation of infrastructure, EIM 2002, p. 2; available at: http://www.
eimrail.org/pdf/polipapers/The_case_for_Separation__EIM_point_of_view.pdf.
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economies of scope associated with the simultaneous provision of passenger 
and freight services. 
Alongside the above analyzed benefits to competition, making it possible to 
privatise the incumbent seems to be the key advantage of vertical separation. 
Such an option also exists, at least theoretically, in the case of a vertically-
integrated railway company. In practice however, since the financing of the 
development of infrastructure is commonly perceived as a task associated 
with a modern state, privatization of infrastructure is regarded in Europe 
(and elsewhere) as a controversial solution (except for telecoms). This is 
particularly so in relation to railway infrastructure since its development 
and maintenance is especially capital-intensive. Both investors and public 
authorities are additionally discouraged by the unsuccessful experiences of 
the UK. As a result, no European country is currently planning to privatize 
their railway infrastructure and it is unlikely that this approach will change 
in the near future. Unlike vertical separation, the privatization of an already 
de-merged incumbent is not controversial, usually after its division into at least 
two companies operating respectively in the passenger and freight segments of 
the downstream market. First, privatization eradicates the danger of conflict 
between the proprietary and regulatory functions of public authority. Second, 
it creates a chance for an incumbent to obtain the financial resources needed 
for modernization. Finally, in the case of privatization by a strategic investor, 
an incumbent can benefit from a new organizational culture and managerial 
know-how.
Thus a unique opportunity related to the vertical disintegration of a large 
railway company of building a new organizational culture and management 
structure of independent companies formed as a result of this process. This 
chance is of utmost importance for this sector. It creates the possibility 
of dismantling the fossilized structures of rail bureaucracy following an 
administrative or technical, rather than commercial, business model and 
having difficulties adapting to changing market realities. Moreover, the last 
few decades of continuing and deepening crisis have greatly affected rail 
transport which has, as a result, largely abandoned its traditional mission-
oriented organizational culture. Instead, focus was placed on the maximization 
of internal benefits such as the privileges associated with “uniformed services” 
including: early retirement, their own health service, job security and free 
travel for employees and their families. In a number of European countries, 
the chance of introducing a new organizational culture seems to prevail over 
other benefits associated with vertical separation of rail transport. However, 
this task faces many challenges including opposition of the managerial staff 
and labour unions as well as the need to introduce an effective motivation 
scheme for passive or even demoralized personnel. Still, the break-up makes 
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it impossible to postpone restructuralisation, enforcing a decision which could 
never be taken otherwise for political reasons or because of the passiveness 
of the managerial sphere.
The benefits of vertical separation are thus not exclusive to new market 
participants and regulators. An incumbent can directly benefit from 
privatization, specialization, precipitation of restructuralisation and a new 
organizational culture. Shedding responsibility for infrastructure constitutes 
another advantage of vertical separation beneficial especially from the point of 
view of an incumbent’s managerial board. This issue can prove to be of particular 
importance when public authorities fail to carry out their responsibilities in 
relation to the financing of infrastructure and a regulator prevents the raising 
of access charges for its use. A given incumbent may prefer to be in a situation 
where it is no longer in charge of infrastructure, especially if its regulator is 
proactive in its actions. This factor is particularly relevant in the initial phase 
of liberalization when the commitment of a regulator does not necessarily 
parallel his experience and especially when a regulator is authorized to apply 
such controversial regulatory measures as e.g. assisted entry. 
According to the report on the restructuralisation of railway transport in 
OECD countries, even if some argue that vertical separation enhances costs 
transparency and the appropriate allocation of government subsidies to the 
development of rail transport, these benefits can be attributed primarily to 
the separation of accounts rather than to structural shifts20. However, in spite 
of the use of separate accounts, a vertically-integrated incumbent may still 
be inclined to inappropriately allocate costs between its infrastructure and 
transport business enabling it to allocate subsidies in a manner inconsistent 
with the intentions of public authorities. Structural separation can therefore 
be said to contribute to the creation of a transparent system of subsidization 
of rail infrastructure and public services.
Another key benefit of vertical separation can be associated with the fact 
that it creates a unique, not excessively burdensome, regulatory regime for 
all market participants21. On this basis, it is possible to adopt a precise and 
qualifications-compatible division of supervisory tasks between the antitrust 
authority and the sector-specific regulator whereby the former can assume 
responsibility for the monitoring of competition in downstream markets. 
An antitrust authority may prove more efficient in this area than a sectorial 
regulator seeing as it has at its disposal the necessary tools, experience 
and personnel qualified to deal with anti-competitive market behavior. 
20 Structural reform in the rail industry, DAF/COMP(2005)46, (OECD 2005), p. 61.
21 Such a regime would encompass, among other things, a duty to meet the requirements 
necessary to obtain a licence and technical certificates as well as an obligation of regulatory 
reporting. 
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A regulator, equipped with sectorial expertise, may thus attribute most of 
his resources to the supervision of infrastructure management and to the 
creation of procedures meant to improve the functioning of railway markets. 
A clear division of competence does by no means preclude the possibility of 
cooperation between the two authorities – quite the opposite in fact – it may 
contribute to its enhancement. 
Moreover, the submission of all downstream market players to a unique 
regulatory regime and the elimination of infrastructure-control-related 
asymmetry can in the long term strengthen cooperation between operators. 
This factor might prove crucial, because due to the competitive pressure 
exercised by haulage companies, rail transport has not only the potential 
for competition but also for close cooperation. Thus, even though vertical 
separation remains a predominantly pro-competition measure, it can also 
create favourable conditions for cooperation in downstream markets.
IV.  Coordination of the production process and propensity to invest 
in specialized assets
The “loss of coordinated action benefit” has long since been identified 
as a potential effect of introducing competition in network industries. To 
illustrate, D. W. Carlton and J. M. Klamer wrote in 1983 that in the case of 
the introduction of competition „the special need for coordinated action in 
network industries must be recognized”22. Does vertical separation aggravate 
the loss of benefit of coordinated action in comparison to mandatory access? 
Any attempt to answer it should, as it seems, take two factors into account, 
that is, the coordination of capacity utilization and investment decisions, which 
are in turn linked to the problem of the propensity to invest in specialized 
assets.
At first glance, the issue of allocation seems neutral from the point of 
view of the choice between mandatory access and vertical separation. Either 
way, EU legislation requires that allocation is made in a manner independent 
from operators – by an independent allocating body or by an independent 
infrastructure manager. Still, unlike an allocating body which has no influence 
over the incumbent’s investment process, an infrastructure manager can improve 
long-term capacity allocation by appropriately shaping its investments. The 
knowledge of recurring problem areas can allow an infrastructure manager to 
reduce or eliminate the risk of bottlenecks and direct its investments towards 
22 D. W. Carlton, J. M. Klamer, “The Need for Coordination Among Firms, with Special 
Reference to Network Industries” (1983) 50  University of Chicago Law Review.
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an increase of capacity on the busiest sections of the rail tracks. This factor 
must be stressed as extremely important.
Economic literature often presents the integration of subsequent stages 
of the production process within a single company as a tool of minimizing 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour of co-operators through the attempts to 
renegotiate contracts over their duration. The more specialized the assets 
used as inputs in the production process, the higher the risk associated with 
such behaviour. O. E. Williamson even considers the specificity of assets to be 
a crucial issue for vertical integration23. Both infrastructure and rolling stock 
are highly specialized assets and what’s more, the possibility of using the latter 
is strictly dependent on the existence, physical characteristics and access to 
the former. This is the basis of the frequently articulated fear that separating 
infrastructure from an incumbent could negatively influence its propensity to 
invest in rolling stock. 
However, the likelihood of this effect occurring in EU rail transport is 
minimized by the parallel existence of three factors:
• the infrastructure market is subjected to economic regulation;
• compatibility of infrastructure and rolling stock is regulated by strict 
technical standards;
• responsibility for basic infrastructure lies with its owner – in this case, 
the state. 
Regulating the infrastructure market contributes to the reduction of the 
risk that an operator (also incumbent) that has invested in highly-specialized 
production assets – rolling stock in particular but also infrastructure such as 
freight terminals – will be exposed to attempts to renegotiate the economic 
terms of their contract (price in particular) relating to a key input or even 
of being issued a notice of termination (access denial). The risk of an 
infrastructure owner discretionally modifying its key physical features, making 
it impossible for an operator to use specialized assets that it has acquired, is 
eliminated by the existence of specific technical standards. Finally, the fact that 
the state is responsible for the infrastructure minimizes the risk of its manager 
being engaged in activities that could result in an irrevocable depletion of its 
reserves. To illustrate, an infrastructure manager would not be allowed to 
eliminate a chosen element of its infrastructure, vital to operators, just because 
it is located on an expensive plot of land which the manager wishes to sell. 
Since proprietary supervision is exercised by the state, it is justifiable to expect 
that such operations will be blocked in the public interest. On the same basis, 
it is likely that public authorities will be quicker to intervene if the regulation 
or management of the infrastructure market is not performed appropriately. 
23 O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, markets, relational 
contracting, Free Press 1985.
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It could be reasonably argued therefore, that the risk of an incumbent 
reducing its investments in specialized assets as a result of vertical separation 
will be reduced by the simultaneous occurrence of the three aforementioned 
factors. At the same time, in the case of new entrants, vertical separation 
minimizes the risk of such investments by eliminating the possibility of strategic 
foreclosure of the downstream market by an incumbent. It can be thus assumed 
that vertical separation in rail transport in Europe helps maintain a low level 
of investment risk in specialized assets for downstream market competitors.   
Vertical separation should not have a negative impact on investment 
decisions concerning the development, modernization and maintenance of 
railway infrastructure, which is public property and infrastructure investments 
are only partially financed from access fees. A decision taken by public 
authorities to de-merge an incumbent is taken on the basis of the belief that 
it is right to do so. It should therefore not lower the propensity to invest in 
infrastructure. Since structural separation favours the creation of a transparent 
infrastructure subsidizing system, it can positively influence the investment 
process in this field. In practice however, states often delegate decisions to 
infrastructure managers. Thus it is essential for them to know of their state’s 
participation in the financing of infrastructure ex ante (i.e. before fixing 
access charges for a given schedule). State financing should not be exposed to 
excessive yearly fluctuations and public authorities must fulfil their obligations 
in this field. Otherwise, an infrastructure manager might find the risk of 
investment into network development and modernization too high to bear. 
These postulates are also valid for the financing of infrastructure owned by 
a vertically-integrated incumbent24.  
It seems therefore that it is not so much the issue of propensity to invest 
but rather that of vertical coordination of investments between a manager 
and carriers that constitutes an area of potential problem associated 
with infrastructure de-merging in rail transport in Europe. Still, the very 
introduction of competition, irrespective of the nature of the access-granting 
measures, results in a need to horizontally coordinate investment decisions 
because different infrastructure users may present different demands as to the 
directions of its evolution. From this point of view, vertical separation seems 
far more preferable to mandatory access. While an integrated rail company 
is obliged to grant access to infrastructure to its rivals, it does not have to 
take their postulates into account as far as the infrastructure’s future shape 
is concerned. Indeed, an incumbent would not account for the preferences of 
its rivals as it has no reasons to help its competitors. On the other hand, an 
independent manager, one that is neutral towards carriers and whose mission 
24 While the reduction of investment propensity may, for a change, constitute a problem in 
the case of a separated private infrastructure, this issue goes beyond the scope of this article. 
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is to grant infrastructure access, is likely to try to adjust its offer to the needs 
of its customers. In order to do so, an infrastructure manager will consult its 
decisions on the expansion and modernization of the network with railway 
operators and will spare no effort to take account of their postulates25.
The problem of vertical coordination has two substantial dimensions. The 
first one is related exclusively to the incumbent and involves the breakage 
of established coordination channels. The second one involves the risk of an 
infrastructure manager maximizing its own utility at the cost of operators and 
of being cut off from vital information from the downstream market. Both 
dimensions can affect all downstream markets participants.
Breaking existing coordination channels of a vertically-integrated incumbent 
does not concern new market entrants since it does not generate any costs 
for them. Instead, they can expect that coordination with the participation 
of a neutral infrastructure manager will be more beneficial to them. For new 
entrants the “incumbent-rival” relationship is replaced by the “infrastructure 
manager-client” relationship, which favors the development of cooperation 
links that are particularly important in the case of a coordination process, 
including the coordination of investments. New cooperation links in the 
“infrastructure manager-client” relationship refer also to the incumbent. 
However, their development takes time and from the point of view of an 
incumbent, which possessed such links in the past, the necessity to wait for 
new links to form can constitute a negative effect of vertical separation.
What seems crucial at this point is the assessment of the quality of an 
incumbent’s old coordination channels. The result of an effective coordination 
of investment decisions relating to infrastructure and transport operations is 
the possibility of adjusting the offer to the changes of the requirements of 
final customers. It should be noted however, that state-owned monopolies 
enjoyed considerable freedom as to their decisions on the number and type 
of railway services provided. Being indifferent to the preferences of end users, 
they were unable to react to changes in demand making it one of the causes of 
the railway crisis mounting since the 1960s. Paradoxically, the lack of reaction 
to shifts in demand led to a situation where coordination channels between 
the monopoly’s subsidiaries were not developing. Coordination was replaced 
by central planning of investment decisions in both subsidiaries (infrastructure 
and operations) made by the management of the company. 
Market liberalization induces former monopolists (current incumbents) 
to adjust their offer to the needs of end users – the creation of effective 
investment coordination channels is necessary to this end. If vertical separation 
25 The question of whether these postulates can be contradictory constitutes a separate 
issue. However, if the incumbent is the infrastructure owner, it will probably tend to resolve 
conflicts from a position of strength. 
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is implemented during the initial phase of the liberalization process, the cost 
of dismantling old vertical coordination channels is relatively low since they 
are generally of poor quality. This cost may be higher when vertical separation 
is carried out during a later phase of the reform. Similarly to a vertically-
integrated railway company before liberalization, an independent infrastructure 
manager is also a state monopoly. It can be nevertheless expected that it will 
be much more likely to take account of its clients’ wishes seeing as they form 
a relatively small group of railroad operators rather than a large group of 
end-users. 
The creation of new cooperation links between an infrastructure manager and 
its clients is an exceptionally interesting problem. Literature often emphasizes 
that vertical integration of previously independent entities decreases the 
“power” of incentives because managers feel less responsible for the results 
of their actions26. From this point of view, vertical separation strengthens 
the management’s responsibility for the effect of the production process. 
However, this positive at first glance phenomenon can give unexpected results 
in industries for which vertical coordination is essential. In network industries, 
it can prevent the monopolistic infrastructure manager from encompassing the 
entirety of the production process and make it focus on the maximization of 
its own utility. That problem manifested itself in the UK where the executives 
of Railtrack (the infrastructure manager) missed the fact that the company’s 
long-term interest was closely linked with the development of downstream 
markets. Stagecoach (one of the downstream market players) made an 
interesting observation in this context suggesting that this phenomena resulted, 
among other things, from the lack of a cooperative culture accompanied by 
fragmentation of the industry into a matrix of contractual relationships27.
According to C. Pfund, the manager’s independence from operators leads 
to a conflict “in a natural way”. He summarizes the effects of such actions in 
Europe as follows: “[t]he infrastructure units were declared as independent 
and this independence was clearly demonstrated. Cooperation was replaced by 
confrontation”28. His opinion is worth noting even though he does not seem 
to consider the new entrants’ point of view or the fact that, for an incumbent, 
the very refusal of treating the “national operator” in a privileged manner may 
constitute proof of a confrontational attitude of an infrastructure manager. 
Confrontation and conflict are clearly not “the reverse” of cooperation, which 
is the lack of the latter. However, in an industry where the coordination of 
26 See e. g. H. Cremer, J. Cremer, P. De Donder, “Costs and Benefits of Vertical Divestiture” 
(2008) 68 Communications & Strategies.
27 A Platform of change. The Potential of Vertical Integration on Britain’s Railways. A discussion 
paper, Stagecoach Group plc, November 2001, p. 8.
28 C. Pfund, “The separation….”, op. cit. 
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production efforts is a key issue, the lack of cooperation can particularly swiftly 
lead to a conflict as various market players blame each other for interrupting 
its harmony. 
For this reason, the coordination of the investment process between a manager 
and operators proves of utmost importance. Infrastructure managers should 
know that operators possess the best knowledge of end-user preferences. The 
maximization of railway transport services utility for end-users conditions the 
long-term interest of all those involved in their provision. Thus, the investment 
decisions of a manager should take into account the needs, preferences and 
postulates of infrastructure users and fulfil its obligations as to the condition 
of the infrastructure. The risk of an independent manager being cut off from 
reliable information, relevant to the shape of the offer on downstream markets, 
is a potential problem related to the implementation of vertical separation in 
railway transport. The aforementioned possibility of an infrastructure manager 
maximizing its own utility at the cost of operators, constitutes an additional risk 
factor. Both risks may be substantially reduced by the creation of cooperation 
links based on trust and loyalty between a manager and its clients.
At this stage, a regulator is faced by an important task – he should aspire 
to the role of an entity that facilitates and, when needed, enforces cooperation 
between firms. If possible, he should restrain himself from any direct 
intervention into the complex process of service provision by railway transport. 
Instead, a regulator should serve as a readily available conflict solving platform 
for all market players and promote the development of cooperation links 
within the sector. This requires a regulator to strengthen his authority and 
make sure that his “legitimization for regulation” is not solely based on the 
provisions calling him to life. Finally, a regulator should be aware of the fact 
that yielding to the temptation of regulating coordination in a discretional 
manner can disrupt the functioning of the railway market.  
A separate issue refers to the decision-making process in the context of 
investments that require a modification of the technical standards regulating 
the compatibility of rolling stock and infrastructure. In theory, technological 
progress may necessitate the introduction of innovations affecting the “rolling 
stock v. infrastructure” interface. In practice however, the introduction of 
technological innovations in railway transport translates into enhancements of 
the quality of infrastructure and rolling stock without modifying the wheel-rail 
set parameters because its change would inevitably make the new infrastructure 
incompatible with the old one. As a result, the transportation process with the 
necessity of transfers, trans-shipments and the utilization of different rolling 
stock would be disrupted.   
In contrast, it is relatively difficult to assess the influence of vertical 
separation on non-coordination-related transaction costs of an incumbent, 
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which result from disclosing its relationship with an infrastructure manager, 
that is, the costs of the access contract. These costs may be divided into running 
costs (e.g. costs of negotiating) and governance costs. However, according to 
the EU model, access contracts with individual operators should not be subject 
to negotiations29 since non-discriminatory access entails the same conditions 
for all downstream market players. However, collective negotiations are 
not precluded – they can be conducted on behalf of the operators by their 
economic chamber. It is nonetheless still up to the regulator to ensure that 
those conditions are equally favourable, rather than equally unfavourable, for 
all. Supervision of access contracts lies within the competence of a regulator 
and it should be exercised in cooperation with the parties concerned. If a 
regulator proves incompetent, transaction costs can be expected to rise as 
a result of transactions being externalized. That refers also to the costs of the 
execution of contracts.
V. Wheel-rail junction problem
One of the issues frequently raised in literature is a problem that H. Cremer, 
J. Cremer and P. De Donder30 present as follows: “The wheels of railroad 
wagons and locomotives work best when they are round. However, as a wagon 
is operating, the wear and tear on the wheels is not symmetric and they become 
more irregular. This has negative consequences for the infrastructure: the wear-
and-tear on the tracks is increased as is the risk of accidents. Of course, this 
implies that the suppliers of services create externalities towards the manager 
of the infrastructure; we would expect that integration would make them 
take into account these externalities in their choice of maintenance strategy”. 
It is worth noting for the sake of the argument, that the aforementioned 
externalities refer not only to an infrastructure manager but to other operators 
as well through a higher accident risk and the effects of the degradation of 
railway tracks on the condition of their rolling stock. 
This is a very important issue from an economic point of view since it 
centres on moral hazard resulting from information asymmetry. It is tempting 
for operators to abuse this asymmetry by failing to meet technical standards 
regulating the wheel-rail set parameters. However, this problem should be 
considered from a broader context. The use of rolling stock has a negative 
29 More precisely, they are not subject to negotiations in some of their key elements. For 
instance, in Poland an operator can negotiate with the PKP PLK SA infrastructure manager 
practically only the method of settling mutual delays (a non-obligatory element). 
30 H. Cremer, J. Cremer, P. De Donder, “Costs and Benefits…”, op. cit.
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impact on the condition of railway infrastructure – rolling stock must thus 
be maintained and renovated. Precise regulations exist limiting the scale of 
this impact by setting maximum axle loads, maximum velocity on different 
categories of track sections, and technical standards regarding the condition 
of wheel sets.
An operator that does not own infrastructure which it uses is tempted 
to run trains at a higher-than-permitted speed, overload carriages and fail 
to observe the maximum permitted life-span of wheel sets, which results in 
their deformation contributing to the deterioration of railway tracks. Vertical 
separation may induce the incumbent to such practices while it will remain a 
neutral element for new entrants (in the case of mandatory access they also use 
someone else’s railway tracks). This risk can be limited by, besides supporting 
a higher level of loyalty within the industry, sanctioning such practices and by 
reducing the asymmetry that handicaps an infrastructure manager. It needs to 
be stressed, that such practices are widespread in road transportation where 
carriers do not also own the infrastructure they use (overloading trailer units 
is the key problem). In Poland, the Road Transport Inspection was established 
and equipped with sanctioning tools to reduce information asymmetry.
In railway transport, sanctions can consist of fines and, in particular cases, 
of the refusal to admit the rolling stock onto the tracks. Nevertheless, central 
to this issue is the question of who identifies the offences. If it were to be 
up to an infrastructure manager to declare that an offence took place, an 
operator could defend its action by trying to shift the blame onto that very 
manager – an operator could claim that the manager tried to obtain extra 
profits by taking advantage of its privileged position of a judge of matters 
which directly concern its own operations31. For that reason, it might be 
advisable to advocate that decisions on potential offences brought forwards 
by an infrastructure manager should be taken by public bodies responsible for 
rail-traffic safety. Reducing information asymmetry necessitates appropriate 
financial outlays from the latter even though those would equally have to be 
made by any integrated infrastructure owner if new entrants were granted 
mandatory access to its network. 
Moreover, after a more in-depth analysis of the industry’s needs, it is possible 
to conclude that information asymmetry might not be the most important 
problem in this field. The need for regular check-ups of the condition of 
rolling stock as well as the necessity to monitor their weight has always existed 
in this industry. It even led to the creation of a specific profession of “car 
inspectors” that continue to be employed by railway companies. Their task is 
31 The risk of an infrastructure owner acting accordingly may be even higher when the 
infrastructure is integrated, rather than disintegrated, because this is when the problem of the 
guilt comes into question. 
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to verify “on the spot” whether a car is fit for operation. In the case of vertical 
separation, it is essential for inspectors to act on behalf of infrastructure 
managers. Furthermore, the use of diagnostic track systems for rolling stock 
makes it possible to control the impact of the condition of the carriages on 
infrastructure and enhance traffic safety. Intensifying the use of diagnostic 
tracks is associated with technological progress; it is noticeable both in 
relation to integrated, as well as independent infrastructure managers. Vertical 
separation might be able to induce infrastructure managers to introduce such 
facilities more widely.
VI. Conclusions
Vertical separation is a radical regulatory solution used to ensure access to 
upstream markets in network industries. Its wide utilization in the framework 
of the EU liberalization process can be traced back to the emphasis attached 
by EU law-makers on stopping incumbents from discriminating against new 
downstream market entrants. It can be expected that the scale and nature 
of the potential costs and benefits of vertical separation will vary between 
particular network industries. As shown in this analysis, vertical separation 
can prove a promising solution for railway transport in Europe.
It is not by accident that the term “potential” has been used here. In the 
opinion of the author, it is still too early for an ex post analysis of the pros 
and cons of vertical separation in the railway sector. The liberalization of EU 
railway markets is still not very advanced. In fact, it is still only in its initial 
phase in the case of passenger transport. Seeing as vertical separation is a very 
pro-competitive regulatory solution, its ex post assessment must wait. Thus the 
current phase could be referred to as an “experience gathering stage”. 
This article has emphasised the role of the creation of a close cooperative 
relationship, based on trust and loyalty, between an infrastructure manager 
and its clients. The list of incentives that induce loyalty includes32:
• long-lasting character of the relationship,
• refraining from opportunism,
• reciprocity of rewards and penalties,
• existence of an institution that enforces cooperation e.g. state-imposed 
regulation, authority of one of the partners, 
• clear and prompt communication between the partners regarding policy 
changes,
32 A. Sulejewicz, Partnerstwo strategiczne…, p. 116–117.
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• reporting involvement: as to among others bearing sunk costs,
• complete cooperation contract.
The appearance of some of these factors can be expected to occur naturally, 
such as, for instance, the long-lasting nature of the relationship between 
an infrastructure manager and its clients. Others, such as refraining from 
opportunism or clear and prompt communication between parties, will be 
facilitated by an increase in the awareness of the long-term economic interest 
of managers at both levels (infrastructure and operations). 
The development of some incentives can be supported by regulatory policy. 
A complete cooperation contract is (even under the constraint of opportunism) 
difficult to formulate ex ante, even more so if market relations are something 
new to one or both parties. A regulator should therefore supervise the evolution 
of contracts rather than impose his own solutions. The authority must consider 
itself to be as a “third party” in the already complex contractual relationship 
between a manager and a carrier. As such, a regulator is charged with the task 
of facilitating that relationship rather than hindering it. The authority’s unique 
role is to ensure that the frames of the contract are strictly in line with the 
institutional frames of the newly created infrastructure market. The reciprocity 
of rewards and penalties can be enhanced by contractual provisions such as 
“performance schemes”, which are already in use in the European railway 
sector. Promoting and designing these kinds of tools in close cooperation with 
market participants, remains an important task of a regulator.
A general postulate regarding the role of a regulator in the coordination 
of the provision of railway services is that the authority should not become 
excessively involved. The actions of a regulator should be limited to promoting 
the development of tools serving its enhancement (e.g. reservation charges 
or congestion pricing). He can also favour development of cooperation links 
within the industry, becoming a platform for mediation, and consultation 
between market participants. This, however, requires a regulator to consciously 
build up the level of his authority.
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